# Acceptance 0011: atirc (copy of the atirc repo doc) How to prove an atirc change is safe to ship: repo-level suites, then the prod token-lifecycle checks every contract smoke must pass. - Source of truth: atirc repo `git@tangled.org:did:plc:vtad4w7ujsvz7t6o6iuvmhjq`, `docs/acceptance/0001-atirc.md` at `2f9e8a2` (author: `atirc-dev`). This is a copy; edit upstream first - Last run (sections 1-4): 2026-11-13 01:40-02:40Z, kcp 038bd32e (v0.0.0-rc165-pre1, rollout 20), atirc e962ee8 (repo main; server binary cd0d0d67 = 9e83813), alice. Section 1 PASS on hat-8 (`git archive e962ee8`): `cargo fmt --check` clean, `peer.json` identical to kcp's, `cargo test` 17 + 239 passed, `mesh::` 17 passed, `test_mesh_*.py` 2 OK, `webrtc_loopback.ts` ok (CHROME + ATLIBS_WEBRTC_DIR = atlibs-webrtc 07bf5b7; it skips without them). Section 2 PASS over HTTP: `GET /` (UA curl) 200 53788000 B sha256 cd0d0d67, `/chat` 200 and linked from `/`, `/dl/v0.1.0-9e83813` 200 same sha, `chat.atirc.revoke` 401 without auth and with a foreign Origin; serve pid / iroh restart not checked (no ssh to irc.fedfork.com; no upgrade today). Section 3 + section 4 ssh gateway agent PASS (consent: ssh.socialweb.computer for @aliceoa.bsky.social, temp key on `/keys` removed after, winner hat-8, no bidders list): `ssh -F /dev/null -p 22 aliceoa.bsky.social@socialweb.computer atirc agent run r20s4 < `: `requester_session_atirc_minted` `r20s4.aliceoa.bsky.social` 02:26:38.67Z, JOIN `r20s4@r20s4.r20s4.aliceoa.bsky.social` (the guest's child) 02:27:00.9Z, `r20s4 online` 02:28:01.8Z, prompt answered `x86_64 / r20s4` in 3.2 s; disconnect 02:28:11.42Z -> `requester_session_atirc_revoked` 02:28:11.45Z, hat-8 termination StateSync 02:28:12.70Z (revoke 1.26 s before), Released 02:28:12.76Z, `requester_contract_records_deleted` 02:28:13.39Z, 0 ERROR (the run before, r20s3, the same lifecycle; its prompt went out 13 s before the agent was online and was never seen: prompt only after the `online` line). Section 4 page / CLI token-less: [0005](0005-guest-requester-association.md) on rollout 20 (no `token_minted`, chain to the nested agent, the owner node's `atirc mesh peers` lists it, all DIDs `plc_tombstone` after release) and [0004](0004-vm-atirc-agent.md) on rollout 19. `/chat` PASS: signed out 200, no session injected (the page only reads `window.__ATIRC_SESSION__`); signed in (`/login`, consent irc.fedfork.com client-metadata for @aliceoa.bsky.social): session injected (channel, did, handle), no sign-in banner, member snapshot, a post 200 as `aliceoa` (the presence nick), the `?format=json` subscribe socket 2 text frames, 0 binary; a cookie POST `chat.atirc.post` 401 with a foreign Origin and with none, 200 with `Origin: https://irc.fedfork.com`. Lease death PASS with a note: `atirc token r20lease --lease-receipt # --lease-termination at:///...vm.terminated/termination-payload-)[:16]>` on a held contract (hat-8), pub ok; `kb delete` of the VM 02:30:04Z, no revoke, `vm.terminated` at the leased key `deleted_on_request` 02:30:05Z; pubs at +4 s and +25 s still succeeded (within 60 s of the token's last alive confirmation), from 02:31:58Z every pub `Unauthorized: atirc token lease is not alive` (latched; the persistent latch across a server restart not checked). Not run: send/recv pipes on prod (they publish peer records into the account's repo; the section 1 loopback covers send/recv), `revocations.ndjson` (no ssh to irc.fedfork.com: the gateway's `requester_session_atirc_revoked` and the server's `token revoked` answer are the evidence) - Last run (section 4, held session): 2026-11-12 21:25-21:33Z, kcp e190a3b1 (rollout 19): `ssh -o SetEnv=LC_SESSION=r19s ... atirc agent run r19bot < `: atirc in the guest, JOIN 21:27:34Z, answer 3.0 s; disconnect -> the per-command token revoked 10 ms later; idle release 21:33:21Z -> Released (revoke 5.5 min before); the agent process outlived the disconnect in the held VM (its token dead); SIGTERM removed `/tmp/atirc-agent-*` within 1 s. - Last run (section 4, ssh gateway agent): 2026-11-12 19:41-19:44Z, kcp 919c3bb4 (rollout 17), atirc e962ee8 in the guest, alice: `ssh -F /dev/null -p 22 aliceoa.bsky.social@socialweb.computer atirc agent run r17bot < ` (the agent config on stdin): `r17bot.aliceoa.bsky.social` minted 19:41:10Z, the child `r17bot.r17bot...` 19:41:14Z, JOIN 19:41:28Z, `r17bot online` 19:43:38Z, a prompt answered in 2.4 s; disconnect 19:44:02.0Z, `token_revoked` 19:44:02.06Z, Released 19:44:03.37Z: **PASS**. Open: a held `LC_SESSION` session gets no atirc in the guest (`atirc: command not found`), so the workdir cleanup (`/tmp/atirc-agent-*` gone after the agent ends) is not observable on prod (a transient VM ends with it) - Last run (sections 3-4): 2026-11-12 18:11-18:21Z, kcp 60d0d3b7 (rollout 15), atirc 9e83813, alice. Section 3 PASS: the minting smoke `ssh aliceoa.bsky.social@socialweb.computer atirc agent run r14smk` (temp key on `/keys`, removed after; `ssh -F /dev/null -p 22` from a host whose ssh config maps socialweb.computer elsewhere): `requester_session_atirc_minted` = `token_minted` `r14smk.aliceoa.bsky.social` 18:19:00.96Z, the guest's child `r14smk.r14smk.aliceoa.bsky.social` 18:19:02.95Z, `requester_session_atirc_revoked` = `token_revoked` 18:19:05.62Z (revocations.ndjson), the bidder's termination 18:19:06.86Z (revoke 1.2 s before), Released 18:19:06.88Z. Section 4 ssh gateway agent: **FAIL** on the JOIN: the guest's `atirc agent run` exits `no harness configured` (the ssh gateway path gives the guest no agent config). Page / CLI token-less: covered by kcp [0004](0004-vm-atirc-agent.md) 2026-11-12 (no mint; this section's text still describes the pre-ident.link peer record in the requester repo with a lease: upstream doc fix pending). Web chat: `/chat` 200 signed out with no session injected, root links it, revoke 401 without auth and with a foreign Origin. Not run: send/recv pipes, lease death - Last run: 2026-11-11 13:11-13:22Z, atirc 9e83813 (upstream doc at 9e83813 run as well): section 1 pass on hat-8 (`cargo fmt` clean, `cargo test` 17 + 238 passed, 0 failed; `.githooks/pre-commit` green: `mesh::` 17 passed, `test_mesh_loopback.py` 2 OK, webrtc loopback skipped without an atlibs-webrtc checkout); section 2 pass on irc.fedfork.com (`GET /` curl 200 53788000 B sha256 cd0d0d67, `/chat` 200 and linked, `/dl/v0.1.0-9e83813` 200 same sha, revoke without auth 401 with a JSON body (415 without a content type), serve pid 1694188 unchanged on cd0d0d67, atirc-iroh not restarted: no iroh ops change, 0 ERROR since the upgrade); section 3 not exercised (no minting smoke in this pass: VM agents are token-less and the guest requester minted no r2 token); section 4 page / CLI requester **FAIL** with kcp e496cbff ([0004](0004-vm-atirc-agent.md) last run: the renter's endorsement needs `action=update` for OAuth renters, and R2 never gets its association ref); with the ref copied by hand the mesh part held: `atirc peer show` verified owner alice and the grant's `expiresAt`, the owner node listed the agent once started with `--peer`, messages crossed both ways, a prompt was answered in 3.9 s - Earlier pass: atirc side of the rc153 compat smoke, 2026-11-01 01:18Z; owner ssh agent revoke 01:05Z; mesh (section 4, kcp VM agents) 2026-11-10 15:23Z, atirc 2898af3, prompt answered - Owners (2026-11-11): alice and bob are no longer john's atirc agents (`com.fedfork.irc.agents` retired, no agent-of in their DID docs); each is its own root, so their agents' default channel and owner questions go to alice / bob ## 1. Repo-level gates (run before every deploy) - `cargo fmt` - clean. - `cargo test` in `cli/` - the whole suite (unit + integration, currently 219). Covers: token mint rules (strict-below for child atirc tokens, equal-or-below for account-level), scope enforcement per NSID, lease verification (receipt CID pin, same-repo termination, latch), revoke state, presence + subscribe frames (CBOR default, `format=json`), browser cookie auth (Origin lock), `chat.atirc.pipe` pairing/relay (ws + iroh), owner questions. - Note the known flake: `revocations_persist_across_storage_reopen` can fail under heavy parallel load and passes alone; treat a single failure with a clean rerun as flake, anything else as a real failure. ## 2. Deploy gates (prod, after `server --upgrade`) - `GET /` with `User-Agent: curl` returns the binary (200). - `GET /chat` returns 200 (web client) and the root page links it. - `GET /dl/v0.1.0-` returns 200 and the pinned `/usr/local/bin/atirc-v0.1.0-`. - `POST /xrpc/chat.atirc.revoke` without auth returns 401. - `serve` pid unchanged across the upgrade. - If the release changes iroh ops: `atirc-iroh.service` restarted and a pipe round-trip works (see CONTRIBUTING upgrade checklist). ## 3. Token lifecycle gates (every smoke that mints: ssh gateway sessions, the guest requester's r2 token) A `spec.agent` contract (page, CLI, iOS) mints no token any more: its gates are the mesh ones in section 4. Every smoke that mints must show, from server logs and `tokens/revocations.ndjson`: - `token_minted` for the smoke's subhandle at accept/provision time. - `token_revoked` (via=account, page path) or `requester_session_atirc_revoked` (ssh gateway) BEFORE `vm.terminated` (typically 0.5-10s before). - No leftover revocation gap: if a session is killed before it can revoke, the lease must still kill the token - a `vm.terminated` record existing is sufficient. Manual mitigation for a missed revoke: append `{"revoked_at":,"subhandle":"..."}` to `/tokens/revocations.ndjson` and `kill -USR2` the serve pid. ## 4. Path-specific acceptance ### Page / CLI requester (token-less VM agent, kcp acceptance 0004) - Request VM with an agent -> Held -> release; expect NO `token_minted`: the requester writes the agent's iroh key and atirc config (harness, model) into the guest's secrets bundle; the agent is a co-located account of the guest requester R2 (did:plc on the VM localPDS, `agent-of/`), its `computer.socialweb.peer/.` (its own handle) in its own repo, no `lease`; R2 endorses + grants it, the renter endorses + grants R2 (kcp ident.link cut-over; this section is ahead of the atirc upstream copy). - `atirc peer show ` verifies (owner = a root of the walk of the peer record's repo DID); the guest runs `atirc mesh run --no-publish` (default Jetstream, no CryptoProvider panic) and `atirc agent run` (mesh prompt, harness from its `config.toml`); an owner node lists it in `atirc mesh peers`; a message crosses the mesh both ways; the agent answers a prompt. - Release: the renter's endorsement and grant at rkey = R2 DID answer RecordNotFound; R2 and agent DIDs `plc_tombstone`; a skipped delete ends at the grant's expiresAt or once the contract is not Held. - Restored tab (snapshot) repeat must publish and delete the same way. ### Mesh (repo-level, every mesh change) - `.githooks/pre-commit` green: loopback iroh (`mesh::` tests), the binaries end to end (`tests/test_mesh_loopback.py`: send/recv, two daemons, headless WeeChat on mesh IRC) and headless Chrome over WebRTC (`tests/webrtc_loopback.ts`). ### ssh gateway agent - `ssh @socialweb.computer atirc agent run ` rents a VM as that handle, mints `.` leased on the session receipt+termination, the nick joins the channel, and on session end the gateway revokes BEFORE releasing the contract. - A second `atirc agent run ` inside the guest inherits the lease. ### send/recv pipes - `atirc recv ` mints `.` and prints the peer's hello; `atirc send ` pipes stdin. - Each side's hello names the other's exact subhandle; payload bytes arrive unchanged; the receiver child token is revoked after the test. ### Web chat `/chat` - Signed out: 200, read-only, no subscribe socket, no `__ATIRC_SESSION__`. - Signed in: injected `__ATIRC_SESSION__`, `?format=json` ws open (text frames, zero binary), member snapshot, inline join/leave, posts use the same nick as presence. - Cookie auth only with `Origin: https://irc.fedfork.com`; anything else 401. ### Lease death - Terminating a contract without any revoke still kills the token on next use ("atirc token lease is not alive") and latches it persistently. - A PDS read-error window (429/5xx) must NOT kill a token confirmed alive within the last 60s (grace), and must not latch. ## 5. Lifecycle model ```mermaid sequenceDiagram participant Req as requester (page/CLI/ssh) participant At as atirc participant Bid as bidder host Req->>Bid: contract (RFP, bids, accept) Bid-->>Req: receipt + VM on network Note over Req,At: ssh gateway / r2 only; a spec.agent VM agent is token-less (peer record + mesh) Req->>At: chat.atirc.mint {subhandle, lease{receipt, termination}} At-->>Req: leased child token (token_minted) Req->>Bid: guest runs agent with ATIRC_TOKEN Note over At: agent joins channel, posts Req->>At: chat.atirc.revoke (on release) Bid-->>Bid: vm.terminated written Note over At: revoke before termination; termination alone also kills (lease latch) ```