Verify it. Don't just trust it.
There is no operator vouching for a contract's history: the records do that themselves. Signing makes a record's origin checkable; content-addressing makes its content checkable. Together they mean anyone, not just the two participants, can confirm a contract actually happened.
Signed by construction
Every RFP, bid, accept and receipt is a record in the author's own repository, and each carries an inline
network.attested signature: secp256k1 ECDSA (low-S) over the record's attestation CID, by a key bound to the
author's DID. A record the author did not sign does not verify.
Content-addressed, not just logged
A strongRef pins both a location (uri) and a hash (cid): DAG-CBOR over the record, SHA-256, encoded as a CIDv1.
Change one byte and the cid no longer matches; a reference cannot quietly point somewhere else later.
A receipt anchors the whole contract
The market.receipt is the one record that references all three prior hops (rfp, bid, accept), each by strongRef.
Reading a receipt is enough to reconstruct and re-check the entire negotiation.
$type: com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.receipt
rfp: {uri: at://did:plc:alice/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.rfp/3mm3d, cid: bafyrei...rfp}
bid: {uri: at://did:plc:bob/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.bid/3mm4, cid: bafyrei...bid}
accept: {uri: at://did:plc:alice/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.accept/3mlag, cid: bafyrei...accept}
cid: bafyrei...binding # attestation CID: binds this receipt to the accept
signatures:
- $type: network.attested.signature
key: did:key:zQ3s... # the signer's did:key; the issuer binds it to the party's DID
cid: bafyrei...attestation
signature: {$bytes: "base64-ecdsa-signature"}
issuer: did:plc:bob
What a provider checks before it provisions
- The accept's signature, that the accepted bid is the provider's own bid for that RFP, and that the accept's author is the RFP's author.
- The RFP's inline
network.attestedsignature by the requester. - Its policies, again, on the accept; and its capacity.
- For
vm.delete: the event's author must be the accept's author.
And the requester checks the receipt's cid against the accept (VerifyReceipt) before it holds the VM. Full
field-level rules: the spec.
Verify a receipt yourself
Nothing here requires special access: the checks the two sides run are the ones you can run afterward, from either side or neither.
- Fetch the receipt record and confirm its NSID is
market.receipt. - Resolve
rfp,bidandacceptby their uris and recompute each cid: it must match the strongRef. - Verify each record's signature against its key (
did:key), and that the key is bound to the author's DID. - Check the receipt's own
cid: the attestation CID binding the accept to this receipt.
This is alpha software under a temporary NSID namespace. The cryptographic guarantees above hold today; the endpoints and record shapes around them may still change. Signing, keys and associations in depth: protocol/identity.md.
Access control is a separate question
Verification proves a contract happened. Whose bids you ever see in the first place is what policy modes decide.