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socialweb.computer/socialweb-computer-kcp

socialweb.computer: a compute market on atproto (kcp)

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Verify it. Don't just trust it.

There is no operator vouching for a contract's history: the records do that themselves. Signing makes a record's origin checkable; content-addressing makes its content checkable. Together they mean anyone, not just the two participants, can confirm a contract actually happened.

Signed by construction

Every RFP, bid, accept and receipt is a record in the author's own repository, and each carries an inline network.attested signature: secp256k1 ECDSA (low-S) over the record's attestation CID, by a key bound to the author's DID. A record the author did not sign does not verify.

Content-addressed, not just logged

A strongRef pins both a location (uri) and a hash (cid): DAG-CBOR over the record, SHA-256, encoded as a CIDv1. Change one byte and the cid no longer matches; a reference cannot quietly point somewhere else later.

A receipt anchors the whole contract

The market.receipt is the one record that references all three prior hops (rfp, bid, accept), each by strongRef. Reading a receipt is enough to reconstruct and re-check the entire negotiation.

$type: com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.receipt
rfp: {uri: at://did:plc:alice/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.rfp/3mm3d, cid: bafyrei...rfp}
bid: {uri: at://did:plc:bob/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.bid/3mm4, cid: bafyrei...bid}
accept: {uri: at://did:plc:alice/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.accept/3mlag, cid: bafyrei...accept}
cid: bafyrei...binding    # attestation CID: binds this receipt to the accept
signatures:
  - $type: network.attested.signature
    key: did:key:zQ3s...  # the signer's did:key; the issuer binds it to the party's DID
    cid: bafyrei...attestation
    signature: {$bytes: "base64-ecdsa-signature"}
    issuer: did:plc:bob

What a provider checks before it provisions

  • The accept's signature, that the accepted bid is the provider's own bid for that RFP, and that the accept's author is the RFP's author.
  • The RFP's inline network.attested signature by the requester.
  • Its policies, again, on the accept; and its capacity.
  • For vm.delete: the event's author must be the accept's author.

And the requester checks the receipt's cid against the accept (VerifyReceipt) before it holds the VM. Full field-level rules: the spec.

Verify a receipt yourself

Nothing here requires special access: the checks the two sides run are the ones you can run afterward, from either side or neither.

  1. Fetch the receipt record and confirm its NSID is market.receipt.
  2. Resolve rfp, bid and accept by their uris and recompute each cid: it must match the strongRef.
  3. Verify each record's signature against its key (did:key), and that the key is bound to the author's DID.
  4. Check the receipt's own cid: the attestation CID binding the accept to this receipt.

This is alpha software under a temporary NSID namespace. The cryptographic guarantees above hold today; the endpoints and record shapes around them may still change. Signing, keys and associations in depth: protocol/identity.md.

Access control is a separate question

Verification proves a contract happened. Whose bids you ever see in the first place is what policy modes decide.