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socialweb.computer/socialweb-computer-kcp

socialweb.computer: a compute market on atproto (kcp)

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Two trust decisions, configured independently

A contract has two sides, and each one has its own thing to worry about. A bidder is deciding who it will let run on its own machines. A requester is deciding who it will trust to run its workload at all. Neither side inherits the other's answer: a bidder can be open to anyone it vouches for while a requester is picky about providers, or the reverse. Both use the same mode vocabulary, applied to different questions.

Bidder's policy: who gets to run on my compute

Set when the bidder starts (install bidder --bidder-policy <name>; default bidder-tangled-vouch). It gates which RFPs the bidder will even consider bidding on: a filter over incoming requesters, checked before it spends any resources on a job, and checked again when the accept arrives.

Requester's policy: who I'll trust to run my compute

Set per contract (default requester-tangled-vouch), written as a signed record in the requester's own repo, and referenced from the RFP's policies. It governs which bidders the requester is willing to accept a bid from: a filter over incoming providers. The bidder runs the requester's attached policy next to its own: both must allow.

The modes, read from both sides

Same names, same underlying mechanics, but the question each one answers depends on which side configured it.

modeas the bidder's policyas the requester's policy
only-meOnly serve RFPs from the operator itself, or its agents.Only accept bids from the requester's own DIDs, or their agents.
tangled-vouchOnly serve requesters this bidder's side has vouched for.Only accept bids from providers (or their operators) this requester has vouched for.
mutualsServe requesters that this side vouches for and that vouch back.The same, from the requester's side.
openNo restriction: only when named, never on prod.The same.

Nothing requires the two sides to pick the same mode. A tangled-vouch bidder can still bid on an RFP from an only-me requester: the requester's mode only constrains which bid it will accept, not who is allowed to try.

Vouch and denounce

tangled-vouch and mutuals read the same graph: vouch records published under Tangled's own namespace (sh.tangled.graph.vouch). A vouch is a signed statement, "I trust this DID," stored as a Tangled record whose rkey is the vouched DID. A denounce is the same shape with kind: "denounce", and no policy counts it. Each side reads its own vouches: a bidder (and its operator) checks who it has vouched for; a requester checks who it has vouched for. Agents count as their principal: a bidder is an agent of its operator's account through an association record, so a vouch for the operator covers its bidders.

Vouch

Alice vouches for Bob. If Bob runs his bidders on bidder-tangled-vouch and vouches for Alice, they now bid on Alice's RFPs, and Alice accepts their bids.

Denounce

Alice denounces Eve. The denounce record is not a vouch, so Eve does not pass Alice's tangled-vouch or mutuals check. It does not undo a vouch in another record: treat vouches as an allowlist, not a reputation system.

Where this is thinner than it sounds: a vouch today is boolean, not weighted or scored by how many hops away it is.

When each side's policy runs

  1. The requester creates the RFP. Its policy is written as a signed record and referenced from the RFP: public, fixed before anyone sees it.
  2. The bidder's scope check: its own policy, on the DIDs only, before anything else.
  3. The bidder's full evaluation: its own workflow and every policy the RFP attaches; all must allow before it bids.
  4. The requester's checks: each bid on the DIDs, then the full policy on the winner, right before accepting.
  5. Accept -> provision: the bidder runs both checks again on the accept, then provisions.

How the policy engine runs them, and what it caches: protocol/policy.md.

badge.blue attestations

Every record in the chain carries a signature over its own content-addressed CID, not just an author DID. Both sides check it before acting.

$type: com.publicdomainrelay.temp.market.rfp
payload: {uri: at://did:plc:alice/com.publicdomainrelay.temp.compute.vm/3mm3d, cid: bafyrei...vm}
signatures:
  - $type: network.attested.signature
    key: did:key:zQ3s...
    cid: bafyrei...attestation
    signature: {$bytes: "..."}
    issuer: did:plc:alice

Once a workload is running

Policy decides who bids and who is accepted. What credentials the workload itself gets is a separate mechanism: Workload Identity Federation.