A provisioned workload never holds a long-lived secret
Instead of a provider baking a static API key or password into a VM at boot, every bid attaches a
com.publicdomainrelay.temp.compute.config.wif.simple record: a pointer to an OIDC issuer the workload can prove its
own identity to, in exchange for a short-lived token scoped to exactly what it needs.
The record
| field | meaning |
|---|---|
issuer_uri | The OIDC issuer the workload will authenticate against: the bidder's own identity issuer. |
to_issue | Exchange identifier (openbao-identity-oidc). The token's audience is set at issue time. |
actx | Team or context identifier: the bidder's DID key. Used as the {actx} template variable in subject. |
subject | Template for the identity the token asserts. Variables: {actx}, {did-plc-key} (the requester's), {role} (the VM's). |
token_path | Where the guest's login writes its token on the guest. |
url_path | Where the issuer base URL is written on the guest. |
url_route | The token endpoint path on the issuer (/v1/identity/oidc/token). |
accept_path | Where cloud-init writes the signed market.accept bundle (accept.json) on the guest. |
$type: com.publicdomainrelay.temp.compute.config.wif.simple
accept_path: /root/secrets/publicdomainrelay.com/market/accept.json
issuer_uri: <the bidder's identity issuer URL>
to_issue: openbao-identity-oidc
actx: <the bidder's DID key>
token_path: /root/secrets/openbao/token
url_path: /root/secrets/digitalocean.com/serviceaccount/base_url
url_route: /v1/identity/oidc/token
subject: actx:{actx}:plc:{did-plc-key}:role:{role}
createdAt: "2026-11-15T06:10:53Z"
This is orthogonal to the policy: the policy decides whether a workload gets scheduled at all; WIF decides what it can authenticate as once it is running.
What it does for you: secrets that never touch the public record
run request --secrets <file> (a JSON array of {path, value}) puts your secrets in your requester's own vault, not
in the compute.vm's cloud-init user data, which is public. The VM fetches them at boot with its workload identity
token.
- issuer: the bidder's identity issuer (OpenBao). The guest logs in with a signature by its own ssh host key, which
binds that key to the VM, and gets a short-lived token whose
subfollows the template above. - the grant: before the VM boots, the requester writes a role in its own repo (a
com.fedproxy.rbacrecord) naming the issuer, the audience and the subject it will accept; the bidder lets that guest mint a token for that audience. - the payoff: the guest sends that token to the requester's
getSecretsroute; the requester checks it and returns the bundle. No password was ever baked into the image, and nothing sensitive is in a public record.
Because the WIF configuration comes with each bid, a requester knows before it accepts which issuer and subject the VM will have. If a contract fails, the requester can accept a different bid from another provider and the same flow works. In depth: droplet-oidc-poc.
The exchange, step by step
- The provider attaches a
wif.simpleconfig to its bid, naming the issuer it runs, the paths on the guest, the exchange identifier and the subject template. - The requester records what that issuer may authorize (the role in its
com.fedproxy.rbacrecord) before the VM boots. - The provider writes the accept bundle into the guest's cloud-init user data; on first boot it lands at
accept_path. - Login: the guest signs a login with its ssh host key at the bidder's guest control plane and gets its token at
token_path. - Workload identity: the guest asks the issuer for a token for the requester's audience and calls the requester's
getSecretswith it; the token expires, and nothing longer-lived was ever issued.
The full sequence, with the sealed fallback for a requester without an ingress: guest-events.md.
This is one bid detail among several
See the record reference for how a bid, RFP and receipt fit together.